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The First Major "Water Transfer":
Opening the Floodgates
by Jon D. Ferguson*

On December 13, 1988, two southern
California water districts entered into a
landmark "agreement in principle". The
Metropolitan Water District (MWD),
which supplies water to fourteen million
Californians in six counties, agreed to
finance $92 million worth of conservation projects in the Imperial Irrigation
District (IID), which is based in Imperial, California and which annually
diverts some 2.6 million acre-feet of
Colorado River water to irrigate the
Imperial Valley. In exchange, MWD will
receive 100,000 acre-feet of water per
year from IID-the approximate amount
of water IID will conserve each year
through the MWD-financed projects. 1
Why is this agreement so unusual?
Historically ( and very simplistically),
water rights have been allocated on a
"use-it-or-lose-it" basis-such that IID
(which has a vested right to 2.6 million
acre-feet of Colorado River water annually,2 and which seeks to preserve its
right to every ounce of that water should
drought strike the arid region it serves)
would be unwilling to negotiate the deal,
for fear its "transfer" of water would be
an admission that it does not need orin water law parlance-"beneficially use"
its entire allocation. And MWD, which
would be entitled to the Colorado River
water rights forfeited by 11D if it were
found that IID does not beneficially use
its entire allocation, would clearly rather
"inherit" that water than pay for it. The
December 1988 agreement-reached after
five years of sometimes hostile negotiations-represents a compromise between
these two stances long maintained by
the competing water districts. 3
The benefits of this so-called "water
transfer" are clear: 11D will be encouraged to conserve as much water as

possible for this and any other potential
"transfer" without losing its vested allocation of Colorado River water; and
MWD is able to provide its constituents
with additional water without protracted
legal proceedings and at a price which is
cheaper than other alternatives.
"Water marketing"-the ability to buy
and sell water rights on an open market
as though water were any other commodity exchanged in private markets 4 would result in a more efficient and
rational allocation of this precious
resource than exists under the current
"beneficial use" fiction. Open market
water transfers would encourage conservation, develop revenue to finance further conservation measures, and protect
against drought-to name but a few of
the advantages to be gained. The public
interest demands that other water agencies follow the lead of MWD and !ID.
So why was this agreement so long
in coming? Is it legal? And where will it
lead?
This article surveys the complex
world of traditional California and
federal water law and policy, which have
long been viewed as major impediments
to the implementation of open market
water transfers. However, recent legislation and rulemaking on both the state
and federal levels have finally disarmed
the fear that a water "transfer"-which
is a euphemism persistently used in the
water marketing industry for the word
"sale"-will lead to the forfeiture of
water rights. In addition, recent decisions
by the state Water Resources Control
Board (WRCB)-the California agency
charged with the efficient administration of the state's water resourcesmandate the type of conservation
measures which will now be financed
byMWD.
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the University of San Diego School of '
Law and a former intern at the school's
Center for Public Interest Law; he is
presently a deputy district attorney for
the County of San Bernardino.
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State Water Law
California water rights law recognizes
a "dual system" of water rights, acknowledging both the "riparian" and
"appropriation" doctrines.s

(Winter 1989)

Riparian Water Rights. A riparian
right refers to that right conferred upon
an owner of land, bounded or traversed
by a natural stream, to the use of that
stream or water. The riparian doctrine
requires that the owner of such land put
the water only to such use on his land as
is reasonable and beneficial. 6
No priority in time exists as among
riparian rights holders; 7 however,
domestic users (e.g., household and
domestic animals) may have preference
over "artificial" purposes such as irrigation, commercial livestock watering, and
industrial use. 8 When demand exceeds
the available supply of a water source,
the available water is shared pro rata
among the riparians. 9
In 1886, riparian rights become firmly
established in California in Lux v.
Haggin. 10 Under Lux, riparian rights
are neither increased by use, nor lost by
non use. 11 In 1928, the California Constitution was amended to require that the
state's water resources be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent possible. 12
Riparian rights are subject to this provision.13 Thus, where an unexercised
riparian right restricts beneficial use,
that right is adverse to the Constitution.
In 1979, the California Supreme Court
recognized this conflict in In re Waters
of Long Valley Creek Stream System. 14
The court held that the WRCB, when
determining all claimed rights to water
in a stream system, has the authority to
decide that an unexercised riparian claim
loses its priority relative to all rights
currently being exercised. 15 In times of
shortage, possession of the right lowest
in priority is tantamount to having no
right. Thus, an unexercised riparian
right may be at risk.16
Appropriative Water Rights. Appropriative water rights are not dependent
upon contiguity of land to the water
supply, but are based on the taking of
possession of water for a beneficial use.
Appropriative rights have as their origin
the days of the California Gold Rush,
when miners diverted water required for
their placer mining claims. 17 These
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miners were responsible for adopting
the priority rule of "first in time, first in
right," a concept which has characterized
the appropriative doctrine to the present
day. 18 The first statute regulating diversion was enacted in 1872 with the
adoption of the Civil Code. 19 The statutory method for perfecting an appropriative right required the posting of a
notice of intent to appropriate and the
recording of that notice. 20 The 1913
passage of the Water Commission Act
superseded the previous methods and
set forth a procedure for appropriating
water for useful and beneficial purposes. 21 An application, permit, and
license are now required in order to
obtain and perfect an appropriative
water right. 22
Apart from these procedural steps,
the validity of a water appropriation
requires three elements: (I) an intent to
put such water to an existing or contemplated beneficial use; (2) an actual
diversion from the watercourse's natural
channel by some sufficient method; and
(3) application of the diverted water to a
beneficial use within a reasonable time. 23
Water is viewed as a public resource
and, as such, may be privately appropriated only to the extent that such use
is both reasonable and beneficial. 24 Even
uses which are beneficial must consume
appropriated water in a reasonable
amount and method. 25
Priority among appropriative rights
holders, as noted above, is allocated
according to the "first in time, first in
right" principle. 26 Junior appropriators
are entitled only to such use as does not
deprive senior appropriators of their
allocation. 27 A senior appropriator may
take all of her allocation before the
junior appropriator may take anything. 28
The rights of even a senior appropriator,
however, are subordinate to those of a
riparian. 29
Recent California Legislation. Appropriative water rights have traditionally
been accompanied by the forfeiture doctrine.30 In other words, if an appropriator is not beneficially using his
entire entitlement, he is in jeopardy of
losing his right to the extent of the
nonuse. 31 Such a notion has had the
effect of deterring transfers as well as
conservation efforts. 32 Water Code section 1241 provides for the reversion to
the public of unused appropriated water.
In 1980, the statute was amended to
require reversion only if the WRCB
makes a finding of non-beneficial use
for a period of five years, following
notice to the permittee and a public
hearing if requested by the permittee.
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Prior to this amendment, such rights
could be lost after only three years of
non-beneficial use, and the permittee
was not clearly entitled to a public hearing prior to the reversion. Rather than
encouraging conservation or transfers,
the harshness and uncertainty of the
previous version of the statute encouraged hasty use of the appropriated
amounts so as not to result in non-use.3 3
The 1980 amendment of section 1241
was consistent with a trend in California
legislation beginning in 1978 which clearly encourages the transfer of appropriated water rights in order to maximize
the water's utility. In 1978, Water Code
section 1010 was amended to remove
disincentives to the use of reclaimed
water. Amended subsection (b) provides:
"Water, or the right to the use of water,
the use of which has ceased or been
reduced as the result of the use of reclaimed or polluted water. .. may be sold,
leased, exchanged, or otherwise transferred pursuant to any provision of law
relating to the transfer of water or water
rights .... " Under this amendment, a reduction in the use of appropriated water
by virtue of substitution of reclaimed
water will not cause reversion to the
public; instead, the right to that saved
appropriated water may be sold, exchanged or otherwise transferred.
In 1979, Water Code section 1011
was added, which explicitly declares
conservation to be within the meaning
of "beneficial use." For example,
"[ w]here water appropriated for irrigation purposes is not used by reason of
land fallowing or crop rotation, the
reduced usage shall be deemed water
conservation .... " As amended in I 982,
section 10 I I provides that water so conserved may be sold, leased, exchanged,
or otherwise transferred without a loss
of any amount of the appropriation. In
1980, Water Code section 109 was added,
declaring the policy of the state in promoting the efficient use of water: " .. .It is
hereby declared to be the established
policy of this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water rights
where consistent with the public welfare
of the place of export and the place of
import." Section 109 was amended in
1982 to direct the Department of Water
Resources, the WRCB, and all other
appropriate state agencies to encourage
voluntary transfers by, among other
things, providing technical assistance in
order to identify and implement water
conservation measures which will make
additional water available for transfer.
Also in 1980, the California legislature added section 1244 to the Water

Code, as further evidence of a policy
aimed at promoting water transfers.
Section 1244 provides:
The sale, lease, exchange, or
transfer of water or water rights,
in itself, shall not constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable
use, unreasonable method of use,
or unreasonable method of diversion and shall not affect any determination of forfeiture applicable
to water appropriated pursuant to
the Water Commission Act or this
code or water appropriated prior
to December 19, 1914.
This section does not constitute
a change in, but is declaratory of,
existing law.
The most recent legislative mandate
was the 1986 passage of the Costa-Isenberg Water Transfer Act. 34 Section 475
of the Water Code sets forth the legislature's findings:
The Legislature hereby finds
and declares that voluntary water
transfers between water users can
result in a more efficient use of
water, benefiting both the buyer
and the seller.
The Legislature further finds
and declares that transfers of surplus water on an intermittent basis
can help alleviate water shortages,
save capital outlay development
costs, and conserve water and
energy.
The Legislature further finds
and declares that it is in the public
interest to conserve all available
water resources, and that this interest requires the coordinated assistance of state agencies for voluntary
water transfers to allow more intensive use of developed water
resources in a manner that fully
protects the interests of other entities which have rights to, or rely
on, the water covered by a proposed transfer.
Also in 1986, the legislature passed a
so-called "wheeling" statute, which forbids the state or any regional or local
public agency from denying a water
transferor the use of a water conveyance
facility which has unused capacity, so
long as fair compensation is paid for
that use by the transferor.35 In light of
the above-described enactments, there is
no question that riparian or appropriative water rights to California water
may be transferred. However, not all
water used in California is of completely
intrastate origin. At the heart of California's water marketing and water rights
controversy lies the Colorado River.
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Because the River is an interstate watercourse, its waters are initially subject to
a different body of laws.

"The Law of the River"
The Colorado River originates in the
Colorado Rocky Mountains and travels
southwest for 1,300 miles before emptying into Mexico's Gulf of California. On
the way, it passes through Colorado,
Utah, and Arizona; it marks the boundary between Arizona and Nevada, and
between California and Arizona. 36 The
Colorado River Basin drains 242,000
square miles-an area roughly comprising one-twelfth the area of the United
States, excluding Alaska. The lack of
precipitation in this region of the country and its dependence upon the River
as its primary source of water demands
managed use of "the unruly river. "37
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, groups from the Imperial
Valley began to investigate ways to
divert water from the mainstream of the
Colorado River. 38 In 1901, irrigation in
the Valley using River water began
through privately-financed efforts.39
When the necessity of taming the
"erratic and often destructive flow of
the Colorado River into a controlled
and dependable water supply"40 became
evident, federal legislative studies into
the issue commenced. One such study
concluded that "the job was so big that
only the Federal Government could do
it," and recommended that the United
States construct an All-American canal
from the Colorado River to the Imperial
Valley, as well as a dam and reservoir at
or near Boulder Canyon. 41
This proposal was welcomed by the
seven Colorado River Basin states, 42 but
it also triggered apprehension that the
faster-growing Lower Basin states (e.g.,
California) might drain the River's resources through "rapid declaration of
appropriative claims"43 before the Upper
Basin states, which had stable population sizes, could appropriate their reasonable share. 44 Since the "first in time,
first in right" doctrine of prior appropriation dominated western water law,
the Upper Basin states' fears were not
without foundation. Matters were made
worse in 1922 when the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the doctrine of prior
appropriation could be given interstate
effect. 45
This uneasiness among the Basin
states prompted them to request Congressional permission to negotiate among
themselves, along with a United States
representative, a compact for the equit-
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able apportionment of the waters of the
Colorado River. 46 Congress consented
and the negotiations resulted in a 1922
agreement known as the Colorado River
Compact (Compact). 47 An equitable apportionment of each of the seven Basin
states' shares of the water was not
successfully negotiated; however, the
Compact did provide for division of the
River between the Upper and Lower
Basins at a point in the River known as
Lee Ferry in northern Arizona. 48 The
Compact apportioned 7.5 million acrefeet of water annually to each of the two
Basins. 49
The Compact-authorizing legislation,
and the Compact itself, required ratification by all seven Basin states before it
could become effective. Arizona alone
refused to ratify the Compact, due in
part to its dispute with California over
the applicability of the Compact to
Lower Basin tributaries of the River,
and also due to the agreement's failure
to determine each state's share of the
water. 50
The impasse was finally resolved with
the December 2 I, 1928 passage of the
Boulder Canyon Project Act (Project
Act). 51 The Project Act allowed the
Compact to become operative upon
ratification by six of the seven states
(including California), provided that
California agree to limit its water right
to 4.4 million acre-feet per year. 52 The
Project Act also provided for construction by the United States of a diversion
dam and a new canal to connect the IID
to the dam-subject to the IID's agreement to pay for these works. 53 On June
25, 1929, when the Project Act became
effective, the IID was already annually
diverting and delivering 2.6 million
acre-feet of water to 424,145 privatelyowned acres in the Imperial Valley.5 4
Both the Compact and the Project
Act addressed the "present perfected
rights" of then-existing Colorado River
appropriators (including IID), 55 and
neither purport to divest any appropriator of water rights which had vested
under applicable state law prior to the
effective date of the statute. Although
the Project Act authorized the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of the Interior
to contract for storage and delivery of
River water,5 6 and restricted the use of
River water except under such a contract, it also "required that the Secretary
of the Interior ... observe rights to Colorado River water that had been perfected
under state law at the time the [Project]
Act became effective. ''57
Thus, so long as the Project Act is
effective, the federal government may
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not reduce IID's 2.6-million-acre-feetper-year allocation of Colorado River
water.5 8 Under the Act and cases interpreting it, the Interior Secretary's
interest is in recouping the federal government's "expenses of construction,
operation, and maintenance of the dam
and other works within 50 years after
their construction, "59 rather than in restricting his/ her contractees' use of
Colorado River water subsequent to
delivery of that water. The impending
MWD/IID water transfer does not appear to be precluded by the Project Act,
the cases under it, or by any action of
the Interior Department contemplated
by the drafters of the Act.
In fact, the Interior Department, as
recently as December 16, 1988, issued a
written policy supporting water transfers
of the kind proposed by MWD and
IID. 60 In its policy statement, the Department recognized that "[t]ransactions
that involve water rights and supplies
are occurring pursuant to State law with
increasing frequency in the Nation, particularly in the Western United States,"
and set forth seven "Voluntary Water
Transaction Principles." According to
the principles, the Department's function
will be to "facilitate transactions that
are in accordance with applicable State
and Federal law and proposed by
others. " 61 Naturally, an additional
objective of the Department is to ensure
a continued satisfactory "financial, operational, and contractual position" for
the federal government following such a
transaction. 62
Thus, the proposed transfer could
only affect IID's allocation of Colorado
River water if the state water authoritythe Water Resources Control Boardfinds that it is somehow a non-beneficial
use which violates the California Constitution.63 This result is not likely, if the
Board is called upon to review the legality of the transfer and remains consistent
with its earlier decisionmaking.

The WRCB and Decision 1600
The WRCB was established in 1967
by the Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act. 64 The Board is vested with
authority over both water rights and
water quality issues. With respect to
water rights, the WRCB has powers to
investigate streams, lakes, and other
water bodies, to take testimony regarding water rights or usage, and to ascertain if water filed upon or attempted to
be appropriated is legally appropriated. 65
The Board also issues permits for the
appropriation of water for beneficial

3

FEATURE ARTICLE
purposes under such terms as it decides
will best develop, conserve, and utilize,
in the public interest, the water sought. 66
It is vested with broad discretion in such
determinations. 67
In 1984, the WRCB issued its landmark Decision 1600, which arose from
allegations that the IID was unreasonably wasting a portion of its Colorado
River allocation.68 Following an extensive evidentiary hearing, the Board held
that IID's failure to implement specified
conservation measures and irrigation
practices was resulting in the loss of one
million acre-feet per year 69-almost half
of IID's allocation. Although the Board
recognized that IID had taken some
steps to conserve water, it found that
"there are additional practical measures
available to reduce the present losses of
water within the District. Under the circumstances of this case, the Board concludes that the failure to implement
additional water conservation measures
at this time is unreasonable and constitutes a misuse of water under Article X,
Section 2 of the California Constitution
and Section 100 of the California Water
Code.''70
In discussing the allegations and its
findings, the Board essentially found
that IID has a duty to conserve and a
duty to transfer that conserved water.
Far from frowning upon transfers, the
Board discussed a potential transfer of
conserved water ("[i]n appropriate conditions, the conserved water presumably
could be transferred directly to another
party by agreement between IID and
the other party"),7 1 predicted that the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation would "support a workable water transfer arrangement, ''7 2 noted that a transfer arrangement was then in effect between MWD
and the Coachella Valley Water District
(which was a small-scale version of the
proposed MWD-IID transaction), 73 and
cited Water Code section 1011 for its
position that, "[ u]nder appropriate circumstances, the maximum beneficial use
provision of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution may mandate
the transfer of surplus water to watershort areas. ''7 4
Following the Board's issuance of
Decision 1600, IID instituted numerous
water conservation projects 75 and developed its 1985 Water Conservation Plan. 76
The Plan outlined nineteen specific
long-term water conservation goals
which would result in the conservation
of 367,900 acre-feet per annum. 77
Because of a lack of funding and unsuccessful negotiations with MWD for a
transfer arrangement, no plan for imple-

4

menting the projects proposed in the
1985 Plan was established until recent
1988 proceedings before the WRCB. 78
During the summer of 1988, IID
presented to the WRCB its "strategy for
implementing those elements of its 1985
conservation plan which the District
considers could be efficiently executed
in a cost-effective manner. ''7 9 In a September 7, 1988 order, the WRCB adopted
the plan and ordered IID to present to
it by January I, 1989 a "written plan
and definite implementation schedule for
the additional water conservation
measures which !ID selects. The plan
should specify water conservation
measures estimated to conserve at least
100,000 acre-feet per annum by January
I, 1994."80
Also in its September 7 order, the
Board directed IID to "specify the chosen
method of financing ... accompanied by
proof of diligent efforts to secure such
financing .... Said proof of efforts to
secure funding shall consist of a resolution by the Imperial Irrigation District
Board of Directors committing the District to fund implementation of the
selected water conservation measures
using District resources, or an executed
agreement with a separate entity willing
to finance water conservation measures
in Imperial Irrigation District, or evidence of a comparable action which
assures adequate funding for the selected
water conservation measures. ''8 1
In reaching its conclusion, the Board
once again noted the state policy of
encouraging water transfers and its
authority to adjudicate the constitutional issue of IID's unreasonable use of
water,8 2 with an eye toward divesting
IID of a portion of its Colorado River
water allocation should IID fail to satisfy
the order. The WRCB painstakingly recounted the course of the IID / MWD
negotiations-including the offers and
counteroffers8 3 -and noted that "[t]he
availability of financial resources for
implementing proposed water conservation measures is a factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of
an existing method of diversion and
use .... If sufficient funding is available to
implement reasonable water conservation
measures, then the failure to implement
such measures could endanger the underlying right. ''8 4

The Marketplace Approach to
Water Resource Allocation:
Advantages in the Public Interest
The IID should not have to be
dragged to the bargaining table. As

demonstrated above, neither federal nor
state law precludes California water
transfers. To the contrary, state statutes
and regulatory policy encourage such
transfers. The interest of the public likewise calls for the free transferability of
the state's water resources, and the
marketplace is the forum in which those
transfers should be accomplished.
Incentive to Conserve. An obvious
yet fundamental policy consideration
supporting water transfers is the economic incentive to maximize the efficient
use of water. Suppose Farmer A has the
right to more water than is required to
meet his current irrigation needs. In the
absence of an ability to transfer those
rights to willing buyers, he will be compelled to use the excess water in any
way possible to avoid the risk of losing
any of his appropriation. For instance,
he may use the excess water to produce
a relatively unprofitable crop which
would serve primarily to use up his water
allotment. If, on the other hand, Farmer
A can sell the rights to his excess water
without losing any of his appropriation,
he will naturally do so since the water is
more valuable as a commodity than it is
for wasteful irrigation use. In turn, the
buyer (who is willing to pay for the
rights) will presumably put the water to
a use which will maximize its utility.
Farmer A will be encouraged to conserve
as much water as possible for transfer
purposes, and the water will be used in
a maximally efficient manner.
Putting this hypothetical construct
into the reality of California's Central
and Imperial Valleys clarifies its import.
Farmers in the Imperial Valley pay $10
per acre-foot for water. To others, that
water is worth $120 to $300 per acrefoot. But, in the absence of water marketing, those others cannot buy it and
the farmers dare not sell it for fear of
losing their allocation. Indeed, as the
market price rises over the price paid by
farmers, their desire to maintain their
allocation increases. In order to maintain that allocation, they flood fields to
grow low-value crops (including alfalfa
and animal feeds) in the desert environs
of California's inland valleys. A rational
buyer is blocked and a rational seller is
stifled. The result: waste and uneconomic use.
Protection of Society Against Fluctuating Water Supplies. The transfer of
water rights would facilitate the implementation of such open market concepts
as drought insurance, by allowing rights
holders to sell the rights to their appropriation in the event of a drought. The
drought insurance concept allows lower-
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priority appropriators to protect themselves against the risk of drought by
paying a yearly "premium" to senior
appropriators. 85 If drought were to
occur, the senior appropriators (i.e., the
insurers) would deliver to the junior
appropriators (i.e., the insureds) an amount
of water consistent with the fee paid.
The City of San Diego's situation
has often been used to illustrate the
operation of drought insurance.B 6 San
Diego is supplied water by MWD and is
its lowest-priority user. It would thus be
hardest-hit in the event of a southern
California drought. If IID successfully
implements its nineteen-point plan and
conserves 367,900 acre-feet per year, it
would have more than enough water to
satisfy its obligation to MWD under the
proposed water transfer and enter into
other transfer or "drought insurance"
arrangements.
The two parties are prime candidates
to enter into a drought insurance agreement. San Diego could pay a yearly fee
to the IID for the future right to use the
IID's irrigation water in the event of a
drought. This fee would operate as an
insurance premium, or as a sort of retainer fee for keeping II D's water "on call."
Were a drought to occur, San Diego
could exercise its option to divert IID's
water for its municipal needs. On top of
the annual premium, San Diego could
also be required to pay IID for the water
actually diverted during the drought. 87
IID could use the funds to compensate farmers for crops foregone due to
the loss of irrigation water. Additionally,
the yearly premiums could be invested
within IID in years where no diversion
is necessary. San Diego, on the other
hand, would be secure in the knowledge
that, in case of a drought, its water
needs would be met. Additionally, San
Diego could avoid the expense of building extra storage facilities to ensure
against a water shortage caused by
drought.BB
Revenue for Further Development
and Compensation. In the case of public
water agencies which sell water rights,
revenue would be generated which could
be used to fund the development of
additional water resources. In other
words, the water marketing scheme is a
system which could sustain itself.
The proceeds from water transfers
could be put toward researching and
developing additional water conservation
measures-such as the ones IID believes
will yield 367,900 acre-feet per year, but
which it cannot afford alone. Transferors
would also receive compensation for
decreased revenue from the generation
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of hydroelectric power.B9
Finally, money generated from water
transfers could compensate for wildlife
loss. For instance, if transfers of water
out of the IID were to result in an
increase in the salinity level of the
Salton Sea, fish and other wildlife may
perish. The revenues generated from the
transfer could aid in alleviating this side
effect.
Preservation of Environment. Open
market water transfers would likely reduce the need for additional construction
of environmentally damaging large-scale
dam-and-canal projects. 90 If water rights
were freely transferable, those in need of
additional water would be more inclined
to buy that water from an existing rights
holder at a presumably lower price,
rather than pay reimbursement costs to
a governmental agency for construction
costs in building a new dam or canal. 91
Conclusion

The open market possesses the ability
to coordinate supply and demand: as
supply of a commodity fluctuates, the
price per unit will vary accordingly as
the gain-maximizing consumer adjusts
her demand for that commodity. Thus,
the system reaches a state of equilibrium.
The gasoline "shortage" of the late 1970s
has been used to illustrate this phenomenon.92 As gasoline prices soared and
lines at the gas pumps increased during
this period, consumers responded by reducing gasoline consumption. Simultaneously, oil and gas producers saw the
potential for profits and responded with
increased supplies. Thus, the market
reached a state of equilibrium and the
crisis was resolved through resort to the
market system.93
There is no reason to suggest that
this same market responsiveness would
not occur to effectively regulate the distribution of water resources for maximum efficiency. In light of the legal and
practical considerations discussed above,
and recognizing southern California's
continuing population growth and the
corresponding demands that such growth
places on its existing water supply, the
WRCB should go far beyond its order
of September 7, 1988. 94 Its authority to
adjudicate the issue of water waste has
been upheld after five years of litigation95-and it has now given IID another
five years to implement measures which
will conserve only 100,000 acre-feet of
water per year. Three years ago, IID
identified nineteen measures which would
enable it to conserve almost four times
that amount-and WRCB should waste
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no time in adopting that nineteen-point
plan and ordering IID to finance it
through water transfers. Such an order
would be consistent with state policy
and encourage other water rights holders
to conserve and transfer-resulting in
the most efficient use of this precious
resource.
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14. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr.
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108.
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28. Id.
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58. Id. ("[the Secretary] and his
permittees, licensees, and contractees are
subject to the Colorado River Compact,

. .. and therefore can do nothing to upset
or encroach upon the Compact's allocation of Colorado River water between
the Upper and Lower Basins .... One of
the most significant limitations in the
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